Iraq: What Next

By: Don Sutherland
Submitted: 2007-01-17 16:25:29
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In the recent U.S. election, approximately 6 in 10 voters opposed the current approach in Iraq and a similar share supported U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq. Leading up to the election, the Democratic Party’s candidates campaigned against the status quo, called for a “responsible redeployment of U.S. forces” and pledged efforts to “promote regional diplomacy.” Now that the Democrats have gained a majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives and Robert Gates has become the new Secretary of Defense in the wake of Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation, the issue arises as to what lies ahead with respect to U.S. policy in Iraq.

To envision the direction U.S. policy might take, one should perhaps rule out what is not likely. Afterward, one can narrow the possibilities for what might be pursued.

The United States is not likely to remove the highly dysfunctional Iraqi government that Iraqi commentator Al-Sabah al-Jadid recently described as representing “none but themselves,” launch a serious and sustained effort to disband Iraq’s sectarian militias and disarm Iraq’s population, initiate a new constitutional process, or seal Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran. The U.S. military lacks the manpower to accomplish those ends and domestic public opinion is not likely to support the steps needed to inject such manpower into Iraq. Without such a robust approach, a policy that would transfer ownership of Iraq’s oil assets to its population via shares of stock, perhaps with a share of the profits accruing to the Iraqi people in the form of an annual dividend, is not likely to be undertaken even as such an approach might be the only one that could create a common stake in preserving and strengthening Iraq’s most important economic assets. In short, an assertive approach that would create security and then build Iraq’s political and economic institutions so that Iraq could be placed on a firm path toward political stability and full sovereignty is not likely.

At the same time, disengagement would impose enormous geopolitical costs on the United States. Disengagement would confirm that the U.S. is a declining power with respect to the Middle East. It would demonstrate that U.S. foreign policy commitments are not credible. It would leave a dangerous power vacuum in Iraq. Iran and Syria would seek to exploit the situation at the expense of critical U.S. interests. Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists would seek to transform parts of the failed Iraqi state into a base from which they could export their global jihad. Ba’athists would seek to rebuild a Sunni-led “statelet.” Sectarian violence would mount, with the worst violence occurring in areas in which Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds live in close proximity. Partition along ethnic lines would probably be messy given the existence of areas characterized by mixed ethnicities and Iranian, Turkish, and Syrian interests. The emergence of a new era of authoritarianism or period of full-fledged chaos and bloodshed prior to the evolution of a new more stable alignment could lurk in the future, especially if the U.S. disengages. Hence, substantial or full U.S. disengagement is not likely.

The status quo approach is failing and has been widely discredited by the U.S. public. Iraq’s emerging government has grown increasingly corrupt as measured by Transparency International. In the meantime, Iraq has evolved down the path of an ever more violent slow-motion disintegration. Monica Duffy Toft, Harvard University professor of public policy, explained, “The trend lines in Iraq are toward a continuation of this fragmentation… The Iraqi government’s forces are increasingly identified as ‘Shiite’ forces. As it stands, schisms will continue to grow, neighbor will attack neighbor, quasi-states with their own militias will solidify and the challenges of stabilizing an Iraqi state will escalate by an order of magnitude.”

Given the realities in Iraq, the electoral outcome in the U.S., and prevailing public sentiments, a course that lies somewhere between the status quo and substantial disengagement appears most likely. “Managed withdrawal” coupled with diplomatic re-engagement would be a good way to describe the likely approach. Such a course would entail the creation of a mechanism for withdrawing U.S. troops, a possible shift of U.S. troops away from Iraq’s cities (perhaps toward that state’s borders with Iran and Syria), a redefinition of their role (training Iraqi security forces and handling large-scale security emergencies, but not day-to-day security), and a willingness to discuss Iraq’s future with its neighbors. Such an approach is not likely to offer a significantly better outcome than the status quo in the near-term.

First, the Iraq experience has demonstrated that the U.S. military’s capability for strategic planning and its institutional memory have both eroded. A 1999 war game known as “Desert Crossing” envisioned an invasion force of 400,000 soldiers, but also warned that regime change could result in regional instability and “fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines” in Iraq. General Anthony Zinni, who headed the “Desert Crossing” exercise explained in July 2003, “We knew the initial problem would be security.” The Franks-Rumsfeld approach de-emphasized manpower and embraced the idealistic assumption that the fall of Saddam Hussein would bring about the rapid birth of a democratic and stable Iraq. General Zinni recounted that during the planning leading up to the Iraq war, CENTCOM had told him that it was unfamiliar with the “Desert Crossing” exercise. Barring the replacement of General John Abizaid, the U.S. military commander responsible for Iraq, tactical and often reactive responses are likely to take precedence over the development of a strategic plan necessary to bring about a better outcome in Iraq. Consequently, the insurgency, militias, and sectarian rivalries, not the U.S. military will largely determine the magnitude and extent of violence in Iraq over the next two years.

Second, Iraq’s insurgents truly believe they are winning. In the wake of the U.S. election, Abu Hamza al- Muhajir, leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, proclaimed of on-the-ground developments in Iraq, “The victory day has come faster than we expected.” Objective data concerning the number of casualties and attacks, and a general failure to apprehend those responsible for such attacks suggest that the military situation largely resembles a stalemate. As a result, barring some important and sustained military successes, the insurgency will likely “chase” U.S. troops wherever they are repositioned in Iraq. The attacks will continue and mounting casualties will further undermine public support for a U.S. military presence in Iraq. In Iraq, as U.S. troops remain mired in a shadowy conflict with the insurgency, the environment will remain favorable for a continuation and possible escalation of sectarian strife.

Third, diplomatic re-engagement would give Syria and Iran formal places at the proverbial table when it comes to Iraq. However, both states already possess considerable de facto influence over Iraq. Iran’s influence is substantial. Such re-engagement could take the form of an international or regional conference and/or bilateral/multilateral discussions. Both Syria and Iran will likely seek to extract gains from the United States that are not reasonable. Syria will want some or all of the following: U.S. support for the return of the kind of hegemony it previously enjoyed in Lebanon, an end to the Hariri assassination investigation, preferable terms by which it would have access to Iraqi oil, and possible linkage of Syrian cooperation to the fate of the Golan Heights. Iran’s “price” will also be unreasonable. Among other things, Iran will likely seek a formal commitment that the U.S. would not pursue “regime change” or attack its nuclear facilities, an end to international “interference” with its nuclear program, a return of frozen Iranian assets with interest, and possibly a dramatic weakening of the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship. Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, sensing that Iran’s regional influence is rising relative to that of the U.S. and being constrained by the attitudes of their own populations, might be willing to offer some economic and financial support for Iraq’s reconstruction, but they are very unlikely to commit troops for the stabilization of Iraq.

In the end, the U.S. will likely take an approach that largely resembles the current path, albeit with some modest troop withdrawals, troop-shifting, and diplomatic re-engagement taking place. The combination of sectarian rivalry and economic volatility that appears likely to predominate over the next two years will more than likely stunt the possibility of a shift toward a better outcome in Iraq during that timeframe. After the 2008 Presidential election, the U.S. Government will make difficult policy choices (odds strongly favor disengagement and a dramatic reduction in reconstruction assistance), seek to limit the fallout, and try to put the best face on it.

Article source: Expert Articles